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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Did the court below err in holding that the CWA's definition of
navigable water in CWA § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362, does not include
the Arroyo d'Oro when it is dry?
2. Does Congress have Commerce Clause jurisdiction over dry
waterbeds of intermittent interstate streams that do not meet any
traditional test of navigability and are not tributary to waters that
meet any such test?
3. Did the court below err in holding that enforcement by a state
without a permit program approved by the EPA under the CWA
can prevent EPA enforcement under CWA § 309(g)?
4. Did the court below err in holding that a state need not enforce
using authority comparable to CWA § 309(g) to prevent EPA en-
forcement under § 309?
5. Did the court below err in holding that a state penalty assess-
ment that prevents EPA penalty assessment under § 309(g) also
prevents EPA from seeking injunctive relief?
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
United States, Appellant
State of New Union, Appellant/Appellee
Goldthumb Mining Co., Inc., Appellee
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Warren v.
City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995); Jesinger v. Ne-
vada Federal Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994).
The appellate court's review is governed by the same standard
used by the trial court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(c). Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. Summary judgment is appropri-
ate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). The appellate court must determine, viewing the ev-
idence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substan-
tive law. Warren, 58 F.3d at 441; Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. The
court must not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the
matter but only determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial. Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The United States District Court for the State of New Union
entered a final judgment on July 15, 2002. The United States
Court of Appeals for Twelfth Circuit has jurisdiction over the ap-
peal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order entered in the United States
District Court for the District of New Union. The Court granted
summary judgment in favor of defendant Goldthumb Mining Co.,
Inc.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The United States brought an enforcement action under § 309
of the federal Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1319 (the
"CWA") on behalf of the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), against Goldthumb Mining Co., Inc. ("Goldthumb") for
discharges of polluted wastewater from its gold mining operation
into the Arroyo d'Oro in the State of New Union. (R. 1). New
Union intervened in the action as a plaintiff under CWA § 505, 53
U.S.C. § 1365, but argued that EPA lacked jurisdiction to pursue
its enforcement action under the CWA § 309(g) because New
[Vol. 20
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Union had earlier taken enforcement action against Goldthumb
for the same discharges. (R.1). Over Goldthumb's opposition, the
Court granted New Union's motion to intervene. (R.3).
Goldthumb filed a motion for summary judgment for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction against both the United States and New
Union on two grounds. (R.1).
First, Goldthumb argued that the CWA does not confer juris-
diction over discharges into the Arroyo d'Oro for two reasons: 1)
the CWA exercises jurisdiction over discharges into "navigable wa-
ters" and its definition of "navigable waters" does not include the
Arroyo d'Oro when it is dry; and 2) Congress lacks authority under
the Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over discharges into the
Arroyo d'Oro when it is dry. (R.1). New Union joined the United
States in opposing the motion on these grounds. (R.1).
Second, Goldthumb argued that CWA § 309(g) deprives EPA
jurisdiction under § 309 to enforce against violations when a state
has already enforced against them. (R.1). New Union argued in
support of Goldthumb on this part of its motion. (R.2). The United
States opposed this part of the motion. (R.2).
The District Court granted Goldthumb's motion for summary
judgment that its discharge of wastewater into the dry Arroyo
d'Oro is not subject to the jurisdiction of CWA § 301(a) because the
discharge was on dry land, which is not within the CWA's defini-
tion of navigable water. (R.11). The Court did not address
Goldthumb's alternative grounds for summary judgment that
such discharges are beyond Congress' jurisdiction under the Com-
merce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. (R.11). Alternatively, the
Court granted Goldthumb's motion for summary judgment that
EPA lacks jurisdiction to enforce against Goldthumb's alleged vio-
lation of CWA § 301(a), because CWA § 309(g) forecloses the
agency's jurisdiction to enforce under § 309 and § 505 against a
violation if the state has already enforced against the violation,
and NUDEP has already enforced against the alleged violation.
(R.11). Goldthumb asks this Court to affirm the decision of the
district court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Arroyo d'Oro, located in New Union, is normally a dry
riverbed. (R.1). In fact, the Arroyo d'Oro is completely dry except
after a major storm. (R.4). After heavy rain it is a flowing stream
and on occasion flows from New Union into the State of Progress.
(R.1). Goldthumb Mining Co., Inc. is a mining company that
2003] 1041
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mines gold in an uninhabited desert portion of New Union. (R.4).
Goldthumb takes care to protect the environment by employing
the most modern mining methods and is very efficient at recover-
ing gold from ore. (R.4). Goldthumb collects wastewater from its
gold mining operations in impermeable evaporation ponds, where
the water evaporates and the sludge is removed and disposed of in
a safe manner. (R.4).
Goldthumb discharges into the Arroyo d'Oro only when it is
dry. (R.1). Rainfall at Goldthumb's operation has averaged less
than two inches a year since measurements were made in the
area, commencing in 1940. (R.4). On rare occasions, once every
two or three years, rain causes liquid to collect in Goldthumb's
evaporation ponds more quickly than it evaporates, thus threaten-
ing to overflow the sides of the ponds. (R.4). In order to prevent
overflow, prior to the monsoon season, Goldthumb drains enough
liquid from the pond into the Arroyo d'Oro to prevent all of the
pond water and the contaminated sludge from flowing into the Ar-
royo. (R.4). EPA's investigation concluded that this only hap-
pened on three days in June of 1999, one day in July of 2000, and
two days in July of 2002. (R.4).
On the rare occasions when there is a storm powerful enough
to cause water in the Arroyo to run, it runs from Goldthumb's op-
eration thirty-seven miles into Progress where it feeds into a per-
manent three-acre pool known as Greenhaven. (R.4-5). The only
wildlife known to survive in Greenhaven is the Greenhaven
Pupfish, which are currently listed as an endangered species
under the federal Endangered Species Act. (R.5).
In April of 2000, the New Union Department of Environmen-
tal Protection ("NUDEP") issued an administrative order to
Goldthumb, prohibiting it from discharging into the Arroyo when
waters of the state are present, and prohibiting it from discharg-
ing into the Arroyo at any time without prior permission of the
NUDEP. (R.5). In April of 2001, NUDEP issued a new adminis-
trative order to Goldthumb in similar terms to the earlier order.
(R.5). NUDEP informed Goldthumb that it will issue a new ad-
ministrative order similar to the earlier two orders. (R.5).
The EPA conceded that the Arroyo d'Oro has never been used
for interstate commerce (R.7). Furthermore, EPA conceded that it
is not a tributary of navigable water. (R.7). Lastly, the EPA con-
ceded that the Arroyo d'Oro is not susceptible for use in interstate
commerce even with feasible improvements. (R.7).
[Vol. 20
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This court should affirm the district court's grant of summary
judgment to Goldthumb Mining Co., Inc. First, the CWA's defini-
tion of navigable water found in CWA § 502, 33 U.S.C. §1362, does
not include the Arroyo d'Oro when it is dry. The CWA allows for
the regulation of the navigable waters of the United States, in-
cluding the territorial seas. Even using the broadest possible in-
terpretation of navigable waters, the dry desert bed of the Arroyo
d'Oro simply is not navigable water, territorial sea, or even a
water of the United States.
Second, Congress has no authority under the Commerce
Clause to regulate dry waterbeds of interstate streams that are
not navigable or tributaries of navigable water. Regulation of the
Arroyo d'Oro is not a regulation of the use of the channels of inter-
state commerce, or a regulation of instrumentalities, or persons or
things, in interstate commerce. It is also not a regulation of intra-
state activity that substantially affects interstate commerce be-
cause it is not an economic activity, there is no express
jurisdictional element in the CWA, and there is no direct link to
interstate commerce. Therefore, Congress is not authorized by
the Commerce Clause to regulate the Arroyo d'Oro when it is dry.
Next, enforcement by a state, regardless of whether the EPA
approves their permit programs, precludes the EPA from enforce-
ment under CWA § 309. To read a requirement into § 309(g) that
only a state with an approved permit program precludes the EPA
from enforcement would be directly contrary to the express lan-
guage of the statute, prior EPA interpretation, and the stated pol-
icy goals of the CWA. Section 309(g) includes no requirement that
a state that has taken enforcement action must first have its per-
mit program approved by the EPA, nor is there such a require-
ment in the definition of "States" in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(3).
Therefore, the district court correctly held that the EPA is pre-
cluded from enforcement against Goldthumb because the State of
New Union has already brought a comparable enforcement action.
The district court did not err by holding that the state does
not need to enforce with comparable authority to the CWA to pre-
vent EPA action. The CWA prevents the EPA from acting when
the state is acting with comparable authority, but the authority
exercised does not have to compare with the CWA in every en-
forcement action. The ability of the state to use the same author-
ity is all that is needed to bar EPA action when the state is
20031 1043
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effectively controlling the pollution. Further, the interpretation of
comparability is a question of law. The district court is not obli-
gated to defer to the EPA's interpretation of comparability. The
district court properly determined that the pollution is under con-
trol, and therefore, the state did not need to enforce with compara-
ble authority to the CWA.
Finally, the district court did not err in holding that the bar
on civil penalties also works to bar the EPA from seeking injunc-
tive relief. The intent of the CWA is to protect the primary en-
forcer status of a state actor or the EPA where appropriate. New
Union is the primary enforcer in this case and is taking the appro-
priate steps to resolve the problem; therefore, New Union should
be free from unnecessary or duplicative action by the EPA. Nu-
merous court holdings support the district courts interpretation
that the provision barring citizens seeking civil penalties also bars
the use of injunctive relief. Injunctive relief in this case would un-
necessarily disrupt the cooperative nature of the CWA in allowing
state actors to remedy pollution problems without undue interfer-
ence from the EPA.
ARGUMENT
I. THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S DEFINITION OF
NAVIGABLE WATER FOUND IN CWA § 502, 33
U.S.C. § 1362, DOES NOT INCLUDE THE
ARROYO D'ORO WHEN IT IS DRY
The Clean Water Act's definition of navigable water is found
in CWA § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362. This definition does not include
the Arroyo d'Oro when it is dry. CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(7) regulates "navigable waters" defined as "the waters of
the United States, including the territorial seas." Congress
granted the EPA authority to implement and interpret the CWA.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(d). The court below correctly found that the
CWA exercises jurisdiction only over discharges into "navigable
waters" and its definition of "navigable waters" does not include
the Arroyo d'Oro when it is dry. (R.8).
The lower court addressed this question and correctly rested
its decision on the belief that the Arroyo d'Oro does not fall within
the EPA's regulatory definition of "navigable waters" when it is
dry. (R.7). The EPA interprets the CWA's definition of "navigable
water" broadly to include, "[A1ll other waters such as intrastate
lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams).., the use
[Vol. 20
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degradation, or destruction of which would affect or could affect
interstate or foreign commerce.. . ." 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2001).
The court below held that EPA's inclusion of intermittent bod-
ies of water within its definition of navigable waters means that
they are navigable waters only when they are bodies of water, not
when they are dry land. (R.8). Therefore, the Arroyo d'Oro, as a
dry riverbed, does not fall within the EPA's definition of "naviga-
ble waters." Whether Goldthumb violated and will continue to vi-
olate the CWA thus depends on whether this court affirms the
decision of the lower court. This court should affirm the district
court's holding and not extend CWA jurisdiction to a dry arroyo.
A. The Arroyo d'Oro is outside the CWA's definition of
navigable water
It is important to begin any analysis of a statute with the "fa-
miliar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for
interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent
a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that lan-
guage must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108,
(1980). Therefore, the EPA's jurisdiction under the CWA does not
attach unless the Arroyo d'Oro is a water of the United States.
The Court in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159,
171-172 (2001) held that there had to be some indicia of navigabil-
ity for water to be considered navigable. In Solid Waste Agency,
the Court was dealing with permanent bodies of water. In con-
trast, the Arroyo d'Oro is a bone-dry desert most of the time and
wet only a few times a year. (R.7). As the court below stated, "it
boggles the imagination to say that bone-dry desert is water, let
alone navigable." (R.7).
The Supreme Court noted that the CWA usage of "navigable
Waters" is broader than "the classical understanding of that
term." United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121, (1985). In Riverside Bayview, the Supreme Court held that
intermittent swamps are within the definition of navigable water
when they are adjacent to navigable waters, but it did not address
whether they are within the definition of navigable waters when
they are dry, as opposed to when they are wet. In our case, the
Arroyo d'Oro is dry. Furthermore, the EPA concedes that the Ar-
royo d'Oro is not a tributary of navigable water. (R.7). Addition-
ally, the Court in Riverside Bayview noted that the term
20031 1045
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"navigable" is of "limited import." Id. at 133, 106 S.Ct. 455. How-
ever, the Court did not express an opinion on whether the Corps
had authority to regulate wetlands not adjacent to open water. In
Solid Waste Agency, the Court held that the CWA statute's text
will not allow extension of the Corps' jurisdiction to isolated wet-
lands. 531 U.S.159, 172.
Significant nexus between wetlands and "navigable waters"
in Riverside Bayview was not present in Solid Waste Agency be-
cause the ponds were not adjacent to open water. The text of the
statute does not allow this. Similarly, in our case, there is no
nexus between any wetlands and "navigable waters." Therefore,
applying the ruling in Solid Waste Agency, the court must hold
that the text of the statute does not allow the EPA to have juris-
diction over the Arroyo d'Oro under the CWA's definition of navi-
gable waters.
B. Dry riverbeds of intermittent streams do not have waters
that flow into public waters
The question before this court is whether the Arroyo d'Oro is
within the EPA's regulatory definition of "waters of the United
States" when the Arroyo d'Oro is dry. Goldthumb discharges its
liquid to the Arroyo only when it is dry and it not a waterway at
all. (R.7). The enforcement action the EPA brought against
Goldthumb shows that the EPA interprets "navigable water" to
include the Arroyo d'Oro, even when it is dry. (R.7).
The court below correctly held that EPA's inclusion of inter-
mittent bodies of water within its definition of navigable waters
means that they are navigable waters only when they are bodies
of water, not when they are dry land. (R.8).
In its regulations, the EPA defines "waters of the United
States" to include "intermittent streams." 40 C.F.R. § 122.2
(2001). In United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181,
1187 (D. Ariz. 1975), the court found that the EPA had jurisdiction
over "any waterway, including normally dry arroyos." However,
the EPA's regulation and case law do not indicate whether inter-
mittent streams are navigable when they are dry or only when
they are wet. In Phelps, the court went on to say that the scope of
the Act extends to "normally dry arroyos through which water
may flow, where such water will ultimately end up in public wa-
ters". Id. at 1187. In order for water to flow and ultimately end up
in public water, it would be necessary for water to be present in
the arroyo. This would lead to the conclusion that the court in
[Vol. 20
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Phelps meant that the scope of the Act extends to normally dry
arroyos when there is water present. According to our facts, the
Arroyo d'Oro is completely dry except after a major storm. (R.4).
After a storm, water runs in the Arroyo for a few days. (R.1).
When there is water is the Arroyo d'Oro, Goldthumb does not dis-
charge. (R.1).
A major storm would cause Goldthumb's evaporation ponds to
fill more quickly then liquid can evaporate, thus threatening to
overflow the sides of the ponds. (R.4). Discharge into the Arroyo
d'Oro happens only when, in anticipation of major storm, while
still dry, Goldthumb must drain enough liquid from the pond
through a series of pipes into the Arroyo d'Oro to maintain free-
board during the rainy season. (R.4). An occasion like this is rare,
happening only once every two to three years. (R.4) Those charac-
teristics would make Goldthumb's evaporation pond discharge
into the Arroyo d'Oro comparable to the isolated ponds that the
court considered in Solid Waste Agency. When the Arroyo d'Oro is
dry, the evaporation ponds Goldthumb discharges into are not
navigable. The court in Solid Waste Agency concluded that the
ponds relevant to that case were not navigable. 121 S.Ct at 172.
The court in that case held that isolated ponds were not subject to
the jurisdiction of the Corps' jurisdiction under the CWA. 121
S.Ct. at 162.
In conclusion, the lower court correctly held that the Arroyo
d'Oro does not fall within the EPA's definition of "navigable wa-
ters" when its dry.
II. CONGRESS HAS NO AUTHORITY UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE TO REGULATE DRY
WATERBEDS OF INTERSTATE STREAMS THAT
ARE NOT NAVIGABLE OR TRIBUTARIES OF
NAVIGABLE WATERS
Congress lacks authority under the Commerce Clause to reg-
ulate dry interstate waterways. The lower court did not need to
address this constitutional question because it correctly held that
the Arroyo d'Oro does not fall within the CWA's definition of "navi-
gable waters" when it is dry. (R.7). However, if this court finds
that the Arroyo d'Oro is a "navigable water" within EPA's regula-
tions, it must then ask whether the Commerce Clause gives Con-
gress the authority to exercise jurisdiction over the Arroyo d'Oro
when it is dry. The answer is clearly no.
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Any discussion of the scope of the Commerce Clause should
begin with the "first principles." See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
551 (1995). First, the Constitution created a government of enu-
merated powers. Id. (citing Art. I, § 8). "The powers delegated by
the . . . Constitution to the federal government are few and de-
fined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite." Id. (quoting James Madison, The Fed-
eralist, No. 45, pp. 292-293 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)).
The Constitution grants Congress the power to "[tlo regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes." Id. (citing Art. I, § 8, cl. 3). The
power granted by the Commerce Clause "is complete in itself, may
be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations
other than are prescribed in the constitution." Id. at 555 (quoting
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (1824)). Despite this broad
grant of power, the Supreme Court has recognized that "limita-
tions on the commerce power are inherent in the very language of
the Commerce Clause." Id.
In Lopez, the Court identified three broad categories of activ-
ity that Congress has the power to regulate under the Commerce
Clause. 514 U.S. at 558. First, Congress may regulate the use of
the channels of interstate commerce. Id. Second, Congress is em-
powered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, or persons or things, in interstate commerce. Id.
Third, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regu-
late those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
Id. at 559. Congress lacks authority to regulate the Arroyo d'Oro
because it does not implicate any of the three categories identified
by the Court in Lopez. It does not involve the "use of the channels
of interstate commerce," regulate an instrumentality or thing in
interstate commerce, or have a substantial affect on interstate
commerce.
A. Dry Riverbeds of Intermittent Streams do not involve the
"use of the channels of interstate commerce"
Congress' power to regulate commerce includes the power
over navigation. U.S. v. Appalachian Power, 311 U.S. 377, 404
(1940), rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 712 (1941) (citing Gibbons, 9
Wheat. at 189). The sovereign power of the United States in-
cludes the right to use its waterways in the interest of national
commerce. Id. at 405. The sole question to determine constitu-
tionality is whether the waterway is navigable or is susceptible to
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navigability with reasonable improvements. Id. at 404-6. The
EPA's definition of navigable waters is irrelevant.
It is not necessary for a determination of navigability that the
use be continuous (Id. at 409), but there must be at least "some
traffic" in order for the court to find that the waterway is naviga-
ble. Id. at 410 (citing U.S. v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82 (1931) (holding
that "small traffic compared to the available commerce of the re-
gion is sufficient.")) For example, the Court has upheld Congress'
jurisdiction over the nation's waterways when the commerce in-
volved was the mere floating of logs. Id. at 405.
In this case, the EPA concedes that the Arroyo d'Oro has
never been used for interstate commerce. (R.7). The Arroyo d'Oro
flows only every two or three years after a major storm and has
averaged less than two inches of rainfall a year since measure-
ments commenced in 1940 (R.4). Thus, it would be impossible for
it to be used for any commerce, let alone interstate commerce.
Therefore, it is not navigable within the traditional meaning of
the term (i.e. used in commerce). Furthermore, EPA concedes
that it is not a tributary of a navigable water. (R.7).
"Navigable waters" also includes waterways that are suscep-
tible to use in their "natural or ordinary conditions" with reasona-
ble improvements. Id. at 407-8. "Natural or ordinary conditions"
refers to the volume of water, the gradient of the stream, and the
regularity of the flow. Id. at 407. These factors do not apply to
this case since the EPA conceded that the Arroyo d'Oro it is not
susceptible for use in interstate commerce even with feasible im-
provements. (R.7). Because the Arroyo d'Oro is not navigable or a
tributary of a navigable water, or susceptible to use with reasona-
ble improvements, EPA's regulation of it does not involve the use
of the channels of interstate commerce. Thus, Congress lacks ju-
risdiction over the Arroyo d'Oro.
B. Dry riverbeds of intermittent streams do not involve
instrumentalities of interstate commerce
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the authority to regu-
late and protect the instrumentalities, or persons or things, in in-
terstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. In United States v.
Pozsgai, the court held that regulation of pollution of wetlands ad-
jacent to navigable waters is not a regulation of an instrumental-
ity of interstate commerce. 999 F.2d 719, 734 (3d Cir. 1993). If
regulation of wetlands adjacent to navigable waters is not a regu-
lation of an instrumentality of commerce, clearly regulation of a
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dry waterbed that is not a tributary of a navigable water is not as
well.
C. Dry riverbeds of intermittent streams have no "affect on
interstate commerce"
In addition to power over the use of the channels of interstate
commerce (i.e. navigable waters) and persons or things in inter-
state commerce, Congress' grant of power from the Commerce
Clause is broad enough to permit regulation of air and water pol-
lution "that may have effects in more than one state." Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
282 (1981). In Lopez, the Supreme Court clarified the traditional
"effects" test by requiring that the regulation "substantially af-
fects interstate commerce." 514 U.S. at 559.
The Court identified four factors in Lopez that courts must
consider in order to find a substantial affect on interstate com-
merce. Id. at 559-567. Activities substantially affect interstate
commerce if: (1) they are economic in nature; (2) the statute con-
tains a jurisdictional element limiting the statute's reach to con-
duct that has "an explicit connection with or effect on interstate
commerce"; (3) there are Congressional findings that the activity
in question substantially affects interstate commerce; and (4) the
asserted connection to interstate commerce must not be so attenu-
ated as to threaten the constitutional principles. Id. See also U.S.
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-613 (2000). Applying the four fac-
tors from Lopez, there is no substantial affect on interstate com-
merce as a result of the EPA's regulation of the Arroyo d'Oro when
it is dry.
1. The EPA's regulation of the Arroyo d'Oro when it is dry
is not regulation of an economic activity
First, as the Supreme Court made clear in Lopez and empha-
sized again in Morrison, only regulation of intrastate activity that
is economic in nature will be upheld by the Court. Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 559; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610. EPA's regulation of a dry
riverbed, which flows only every two or three years after a major
storm and averages less than two inches of rainfall a year since
measurements commenced in 1940 (R.4), in no way regulates ac-
tivity that is economic or commercial.
While it is true that Goldthumb's mining operation is a com-
mercial business, this does not make the regulation of discharge
into the Arroyo d'Oro economic activity. Under normal conditions,
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Goldthumb operates without discharging any pollutants into the
Arroyo d'Oro. Goldthumb collects wastewater from its gold min-
ing operations in impermeable evaporation ponds, where the
water evaporates and the sludge is removed and disposed of in a
safe manner. (R.4). During heavy rains, which occur only two or
three times a year, Goldthumb must drain some liquid from the
ponds in order to prevent overflow of all the wastewater into the
Arroyo d'Oro. (R.4). Goldthumb's discharge, which the State of
New Union allows (R.5), is not related to its economic activity.
Rather, it is an emergency procedure conducted in order to protect
the environment from greater harm. If any connection to its eco-
nomic activity could be found it would be so attenuated that it
would fail the fourth prong of the Lopez test as discussed below.
2. The Clean Water Act (CWA) does not contain an express
jurisdictional element
The second factor is whether there is an express jurisdictional
element, which limits the statute's reach to activities that have
"an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce." Lo-
pez, 514 U.S. at 562. The Clean Water Act ("CWA") contains no
such jurisdictional element. As the Supreme Court has stated,
"unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed
to have significantly changed the federal-state balance." Id. at
562 (quoting U.S. v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971)). While subsection
(c) of EPA's regulations do have an "express jurisdiction element"
limiting the regulation of intrastate waters to conduct having an
"explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce" ("Wa-
ters of the United States means: ... (c) All other waters ... which
would affect or could affect interstate or foreign commerce." 40
C.F.R. § 122.2), the CWA does not.
In the CWA, Congress prohibited the discharge of pollutants
into navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. §1311(a). Congress defined
"navigable water" in the CWA to mean "waters of the United
States." 33 U.S.C. § 1362. Congress did not define "waters of the
United States." Even if this court determined that the EPA's reg-
ulation is sufficient to meet the requirement of an express juris-
dictional element, that alone does not make the regulation of the
Arroyo d'Oro constitutional. There still must be "the requisite
nexus to interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 at 562. The Arroyo
d'Oro, whether considered an interstate or intrastate waterway,
because it is dry - does not affect interstate commerce.
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3. There are no express congressional findings that
regulation of dry waterways affects interstate
commerce
Third, the Court will consider whether there are congres-
sional findings regarding the effect on interstate commerce of the
regulated activity. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562. While Congress is not
normally required to make such findings, if Congress did find a
substantial affect on interstate commerce, it may help the court
evaluate whether there actually is an effect on interstate com-
merce. Id. The legislative history of the Clean Water Act states
that Congress intended to regulate water pollution to the full ex-
tent of the Commerce Clause. S. CONF. REP. NO. 92-1236, re-
printed in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3776, 3822. When
promulgating the CWA, Congress made no findings that water
pollution in dry waterways affects interstate commerce. Even if
there were legislative findings, as the Court made clear in Morri-
son, "the existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by
itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legisla-
tion." 529 U.S. at 614.
4. There is no direct link between the regulation of a dry
waterbed and interstate commerce
Finally, the Supreme Court held in Lopez that the asserted
connection to interstate commerce must not be so attenuated as to
threaten the constitutional principle of enumerated powers. Id. at
613 and 615. EPA's regulation of a dry waterbed in the State of
New Union, if any connection to interstate commerce could be
found, would be so attenuated as to exceed the limits of the Com-
merce Clause.
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC"), the Court was
asked to decide whether the Corps' Migratory Bird Rule was con-
stitutional under the Commerce Clause. 531 U.S. 159, 160 (2001).
While the Court did not reach the constitutional question because
it disposed of the case based on the regulatory definition of naviga-
ble waters, Justice Stevens (dissenting) stated that birdwatching
was a commercial activity of great value and would have upheld
the Rule under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 194-95.
In our case, there is no similar link to recreational activities
that arguably could be considered economic activity or commerce.
As stated previously, the Arroyo d'Oro itself is usually dry. Dur-
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ing heavy storms, which occur only once every two or three years,
the Arroyo does flow thirty-seven miles into Progress and feeds
into a permanent three-acre pool known as Greenhaven. (R.4-5).
The only wildlife known to survive in Greenhaven is the Green-
haven Pupfish, which are currently listed as an endangered spe-
cies under the federal Endangered Species Act. (R.5). Unlike the
facts in Solid Waste Agency, there is no documented recreational
activities at Greenhaven that could be linked to interstate com-
merce or have an aggregate affect on interstate commerce.
In conclusion, regulation of the Arroyo d'Oro is not a regula-
tion of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, or a regula-
tion of instrumentalities, or persons or things, in interstate
commerce. It is also not a regulation of intrastate activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce because it is not an eco-
nomic activity, there is no express jurisdictional element in the
CWA, and there is no direct link to interstate commerce. There-
fore, Congress is not authorized by the Commerce Clause to regu-
late the Arroyo d'Oro when it is dry.
III. ENFORCEMENT BY A STATE, REGARDLESS OF
WHETHER THE EPA APPROVES THEIR PERMIT
PROGRAM, PRECLUDES THE EPA FROM
ENFORCEMENT UNDER CWA § 309 (g)
The lower court correctly held that the EPA's enforcement ac-
tion against Respondent under § 309(g) of the CWA is precluded
because the State of New Union has already taken enforcement
action against Goldthumb. Section 309(g)(6)(A)(ii) plainly states
that if "a State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an
action under a State law comparable to this subsection . . ." the
violator shall not be subject to a civil penalty under subsection (d)
of this title. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii).
The CWA includes no requirement that a state permit pro-
gram must be certified by the EPA under § 402 for it to be a com-
parable law under §309(g); nor has any court that Respondent
could identify interpreted § 309(g) to include such a requirement.
In North & South Rivers Watershed Assoc., Inc. v. Scituate, the
EPA attempted to make the argument that in order for a state law
to be comparable under § 309(g), it must have been certified by
the EPA under § 402. 949 F.2d 552, 556 n. 8 (1992). However, the
court did not address the EPA's claim because the parties below
did not raise it. Id.
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In this case, the New Union Department of Environmental
Protection ("NUDEP") issued an Administrative Order to
Goldthumb in April of 2000. (R.5). The Administrative Order pro-
hibits Goldthumb from discharging in the Arroyo d'Oro when wa-
ters of the state are present, and requires Goldthumb to obtain
permission from NUDEP from discharging into the Arroyo d'Oro
at any time. (R.5). If Petitioner is allowed to read a requirement
into § 309(g) that the comparable state law be part of a permit
program approved by the EPA, it would be inconsistent with the
wording and structure of the statute, prior EPA interpretations,
and the legislative intent of the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
A. Interpreting § 309(g) of the CWA to include a requirement
that the state have an approved permit program is
inconsistent with the wording and structure of the act
First, Congress defined "State" in the CWA to mean all states.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(3) ("The term "State" means a State, the District
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Is-
lands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the North-
ern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands.") Congress did not limit the meaning of "States" only to
those states with approved programs. As the district court stated,
Congress knows how to vary the meaning of general definitions
(e.g. modifying the definition of "person" in § 502(3) to include re-
sponsible corporate officers for the purposes of § 309(c)). (R.9).
When Congress defined "State" in the CWA, it chose not to limit
the definition.
B. Interpreting § 309(g) of the CWA to include a requirement
that the State have an approved permit program is
inconsistent with the EPA's past interpretation as
evidenced by its regulatory definition of States
Second, the EPA adopted a similar general definition of
"State" in its regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. The EPA's regula-
tion is even more specific than the definition in 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(3). The EPA defined "state" to mean "any of the 50 states,
the District of Columbia, Guam, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico.. ." Id. (emphasis added). For the EPA to now argue that the
statute is limited only to states with approved permit programs is
inconsistent with its prior interpretation of the CWA as expressed
in its regulations. There is no question that when the EPA de-
fined "State" to include "any of the 50 states," they intended the
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statute to apply to all states regardless of whether it had an ap-
proved permit program. This interpretation is reinforced by the
fact that at the time the EPA adopted 40 CFR § 122.2 in 1980, not
all 50 states had an approved permit program.
New Union is a state within Congress and the EPA's defini-
tion of "State." Regardless of whether its program is approved by
the EPA, its enforcement actions carry the same force and effect
as other states with approved programs. (R.10). As a result, New
Union's enforcement actions preclude the EPA from enforcing
against Goldthumb Mining under § 309(g) of the CWA.
C. Interpreting § 309(g) of the CWA to include a requirement
that the State have an approved permit program is
inconsistent with the legislative intent of the CWA
Finally, construing the statute in terms of its plain meaning
to include all states, whether or not their permit program is ap-
proved by the EPA, is consistent with Congress' stated policy goal
"to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities
and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution."
33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). Specifically with respect to enforcement,
Congress intended for states to have primary enforcement
responsibility:
The Committee does not intend that this jurisdiction of the
Federal government so supplant state enforcement. Rather the
Committee intends that the enforcement power of the Federal
government is available in cases where States ... are not acting
expeditiously and vigorously to enforce control requirements.
The Committee intends the great volume of enforcement ac-
tions be brought by the state. It is clear that the Administrator
is not to establish an enforcement bureaucracy but rather to re-
serve his authority for the cases of paramount interest.
S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 73-74 (1972).
In sum, for this court to read a requirement into § 309(g) that
only a state with an approved permit program precludes the EPA
from enforcement would be directly contrary to the express lan-
guage of the statute, prior EPA interpretation, and the stated pol-
icy goals of the CWA. Section 309(g) includes no requirement that
a state that has taken enforcement action must first have its per-
mit program approved by the EPA, nor is there such a require-
ment in the definition of "States" in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(3).
Therefore, the district court correctly held that the EPA is pre-
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cluded from enforcement against Goldthumb because the State of
New Union has already brought its own enforcement action.
IV. A STATE NEED NOT ENFORCE WITH
COMPARABLE AUTHORITY AS LONG AS THE
OVERALL INTENT OF THE ACTION IS THE
SAME AS THE CWA IN CURTAILING THE
POLLUTION VIOLATION
The district court did not err in holding that a state need not
enforce pollution control laws using comparable authority to CWA
§ 309(g) in order to prevent EPA enforcement of the CWA. The
district court properly determined that the CWA's intent is to keep
the state the primary enforcer, and that allowing the EPA to as-
sess penalties in this proceeding violates that intent. The EPA's
determination of when it could assess penalties is only entitled to
respect by the district court, and the court had the discretion not
to follow the EPA's interpretation.
A. The CWA limits agency action when a State is enforcing
with 'comparable' authority
The CWA bars EPA enforcement action when a state is acting
with comparable authority to correct pollution problems. Section
1319(g)(6)(ii) states that the Administrator's authority to enforce
any provision of the act is limited when "a State has commenced
and is diligently prosecuting an action under a State law compara-
ble to this subsection." The law is designed to allow a primary
enforcer to stop the pollution problem without unnecessary influ-
ence or duplicity of enforcement. Arkansas Wildlife Federation v.
ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 382 (8th Cir 1994).
The district court properly determined that the comparable
requirements of the statutes and authority bar EPA enforcement.
The term comparable does not mean identical. Sierra Club v. Colo-
rado Refining Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428 (Dis. Co. 1993). The law
must to contain:
comparable penalty provisions which the state is authorized to
enforce, [have] the same overall enforcement goals as the fed-
eral CWA, provide interested citizens a meaningful opportunity
to participate at significant stages of the decision-making pro-
cess, and adequately safeguards their legitimate substantive
interests.
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Arkansas Wildlife, 29 F.3d at 381. In Arkansas Wildlife, the court
also writes that states are afforded some latitude in selecting the
specific mechanisms of their enforcement program without losing
the comparable quality to the federal statutes. Id. at 380. Finally,
the statutes are comparable when their overall scheme is aimed at
correcting the same violations. North & South Rivers Watershed
Assoc., Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1993).
The district court determined that the statutes of the CWA
and NUDEP are virtually identical. (R.6). The district court also
found that the enforcement action has been effective in controlling
Goldthumb's actions. (R.11). The pollution violations that the
EPA is concerned with are virtually eliminated by the comparable
actions of the state program. It is clear by the findings of the dis-
trict court that the statutes are comparable because the two stat-
utes are aimed at alleviating the same pollution problems, are
effective in enforcement, and have the same overall schemes. As
the district stated, "this is exactly the intent of the 309(g) preclu-
sion." (R.11).
In conclusion, the district court is correct in determining that
New Union need not enforce using authority comparable to the
CWA. There exists some leniency in how the state chooses to en-
force pollution regulations so long as the overall scheme main-
tains the intent of the CWA. The intent of the two statutes is to
stop pollution using the same type of enforcement procedures, and
therefore, the two statutes are of comparable nature thus meeting
the criteria of § 1319(g).
B. The district court is not obligated to follow the agency
interpretation of comparable in this case
The interpretation of "comparable" by the EPA does not war-
rant deference in this case. The Supreme Court has articulated
when to defer to agency interpretations of statutes. The first
question that the court must determine is what type of issue is to
be decided. In this case, the interpretation of the statute is a
question of law. The Supreme Court holds that when the issue
involves a question of law that the agency's interpretation does
not warrant deference on the matter. NLRB v. Hearst, 322 U.S.
111, 120 (1944). However, the Court also reasoned that although
questions of law are for the courts, the agency interpretation is
subject to some amount of respect. Christensen v. Harris County,
529 U.S. 576, 586 (2000). The appropriate amount of respect
given to an agency interpretation hinges on the thoroughness of
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the consideration given to the matter, the validity of the reason-
ing, and "all factors which give it the power to persuade, if lacking
power to control." Skidmore v. Swift & Co, 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944). This case presents a situation in which the agency inter-
pretation does not have the power to persuade, and therefore, the
district court's decision that the statutes are comparable warrants
upholding by this court.
The agency interpretation has the power to persuade when it
comports with the policy and objectives of the statute. Just as
courts are required to do, agencies should construe the statute's
language by looking to the provisions of the whole law and to its
objectives and policy. Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26
(1990). Additionally, the case may warrant examining the legisla-
tive history in order to determine the intended policies and objec-
tives. Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 US 102 (1980).
The legislative history, however, is an area to which courts
should be mindful of its limited uses. Two Justices have written
on the subject and come to different conclusions. Justice Scalia
points out for courts to be mindful of the changing nature of legis-
lative history in that the content may not be helpful because of the
lack of member participation in the debates. A Matter of Interpre-
tation, (Amy Gutmann & Gordon S. Wood eds., 1996). As a coun-
terpoint, Justice Breyer maintains that legislative history is
important in five situations. The relevant situation in this case "is
to avoid an absurd result." On the Uses of Legislative History in
Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845 (1992). The absurd
result that he urges to avoid is apparent upon review of the facts
of this case.
The district court determined that the enforcement by New
Union has been effective in solving the problem. (R.1). Goldthumb
is not allowing highly or even lightly contaminated materials to
flow into the Arroyo. (R.11). New Union does issue permits for
Goldthumb to release contaminated materials; however, the con-
taminants do not enter the waters of the state and only occur
when an inspector is on site to monitor the process. (R.5). New
Union plans to issue further administrative orders to monitor and
control the effects of the actions of Goldthumb. (R.5). These ac-
tions by New Union are controlling the problem effectively.
(R.11).
The district court's determination to not allow the EPA to as-
sess penalties on Goldthumb avoided an absurd result that the
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EPA's interpretation of the statute would create. The EPA's inter-
pretation disrupts the intent of the CWA by disturbing the states'
position as the primary enforcer of pollution violations. The
states' position as primary enforcer is found in the CWA text, leg-
islative history, and interpretive cases.
The text of the CWA could not provide a clearer statement
that states are the primary enforcer of pollution violations. Sec-
tion 1251 specifically states
It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and pro-
tect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent,
reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and
use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of
land and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator
in the exercise of his authority under this Act.
33 U.S.C. § 1251. In addition to Section 1251, the Senate House
Committee notes announce that the
Committee does not intend that this jurisdiction of the Federal
government so supplant state enforcement. Rather the Com-
mittee intends that the enforcement power of the Federal gov-
ernment is available in cases where States ... are not acting
expeditiously and vigorously to enforce control requirements.
The Committee intends the great volume of enforcement actions
be brought by the state. It is clear that the Administrator is not
to establish an enforcement bureaucracy but rather to reserve
his authority for the cases of paramount interest.
S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 73-73 (1972), reprinted in Legislative His-
tory of the Clean Water Act, at 1481-82 (1973). These notes give
radical insight to the meaning of the statute itself because they
shed light onto the reason that the law was enacted. As Justice
Scalia points, the reason for the law is its soul and if the reasons
change, then the law does as well. Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511 (1989). Courts are to
strive to give effect to the reasons for the statute when deciding
the meaning of the statutory language. Even further the Supreme
Court accepts the proposition that states are to be the primary
enforcer of pollution violations. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60.
The EPA's interpretation causes an absurd result that Justice
Breyer says to avoid. The EPA's action in assessing penalties on
Goldthumb displaces New Union's status as the primary enforcer
of pollution violations which would contravene the intent and pur-
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pose of the CWA. The EPA contended below that the criteria of
'comparable authority' allows for the assessment of penalties in
this case. The EPA asserts that the authority of New Union in
enforcing the pollution measures did not match the authority pos-
sessed by the EPA. This argument fails as prior case law holds
that the comparability requirement is found in situations that are
identical to the case at hand, and as such New Union should re-
main the primary enforcer.
In summary, the district court is not bound by the EPA's in-
terpretation of the CWA. The interpretation merely had the
power to persuade; however, in this case, the power to persuade
was lacking. Allowing the penalties in this case would have abro-
gated the intent of the statute and created an absurd result of al-
lowing the EPA to displace New Union as the primary enforcer of
pollution violations.
V. THE EPA IS BARRED FROM SEEKING INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF BECAUSE NEW UNION IS THE PRIMARY
ENFORCER AND IS TAKING APPROPRIATE
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
The CWA precludes the EPA from seeking injunctive relief
when a state has commenced an action and is working to solve the
alleged problem. The statutory scheme of precluding civil penal-
ties when a state is acting to enforce pollution regulations also
works to bar injunctive relief. Additionally, the CWA places re-
strictions on injunctive relief that are not met in this case.
A. The intent of the CWA to keep the State as the primary
enforcer bars the EPA's use of injunctive relief
The EPA is precluded from acting to correct pollution viola-
tions if a state is acting to curtail the pollution problem. Section
1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) of the CWA states that:
Action taken by the Administrator or the Secretary, as the case
may be, under this subsection shall not affect or limit the Ad-
ministrator's or Secretary's authority to enforce any provision of
the chapter; except that any violation with respect to which a
State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action
under a State law comparable to this subsection shall not be the
subject of a civil penalty action under subsection (d) of this sec-
tion or section 1321(b) of this title or section 1365 of this title.
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This section of the CWA curtails the agency's ability to act when a
state is alleviating the problem. The section specifically sets out
the mandate to bar the agency from seeking civil penalties against
the alleged violators.
Section 1319(d) allows the EPA to seek civil penalties to deter
polluters from further action. Within this section, the details for
the use of civil penalties and the classification are given. How-
ever, the civil penalties section does not include injunctive relief.
Injunctive relief is found in a separate subsection. Section
1319(b) details the agency's ability to bring a civil action. Within
the civil action provision, the agency administrator is authorized:
to commence a civil action for appropriate relief, including a per-
manent or temporary injunction, for any violation for which he
is authorized to issue a compliance order under subsection (a) of
this section.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(b). The plain text of the statute separates the
use of civil penalties and civil actions that include injunctive re-
lief; however, numerous courts are not persuaded by the plain text
argument that the bar for civil penalties should not bar injunctive
relief.
1. Numerous courts hold that the provision barring citizens
seeking civil penalties also bars the use of injunctive
relief
The CWA allows citizens to seek enforcement against pollu-
tion violators. The enforcement is limited to when the EPA or
states are acting to curtail the pollution violation. Numerous
courts hold that the bar found in citizen suits against seeking pen-
alties also bars injunctive relief. As the District Court stated, "the
same provisions of § 309(g), indeed the very words of § 309(g), bar-
ring the citizen suit in Scituate also bar EPA actions. The same
words cannot mean one thing when applied to citizen suits and
another when applied to EPA actions, unless Congress explicitly
indicated so, and it did not." (R.10).
In Scituate, the court held that citizens are barred from seek-
ing penalties and injunctive relief when a primary enforcer is act-
ing. 949 F.2d 552 at 558. The court's concern in this case is that
the literal interpretation of the statute leads to an "absurd result"
by displacing the government, who is the primary enforcer. Id. at
558. The U.S. Supreme Court instructs courts in this situation to
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"strive to provide an alternative meaning that avoids the irra-
tional consequence." Id. at 558, quoting Green v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989)(Scalia, J., concurring). The
concurrence in Scituate further solidifies the argument. Judge
Selya points out that the "vagaries of draftsmanship" should not
destroy the uniformity of the federal law." Id. at 559. Other
courts follow this rational.
The court in Arkansas Wildlife agrees with the court in Scitu-
ate. 29 F.3d 376 at 382. In the present case, the state is prosecut-
ing, but the EPA wants to interfere much like the citizens in
Arkansas Wildlife. In Arkansas Wildlife, the court states that "Al-
lowing suits for declaratory and injunctive relief in federal courts,
despite a state's diligent efforts at administrative enforcement,
could result in undue interference with, or unnecessary duplica-
tion of the legitimate efforts of the state agency." Id. at 382. The
court calls this result "unreasonable" because it "would under-
mine, rather than promote, the goals of the CWA, and is not the
intent of Congress." Id. at 382.
These cases fit directly with the issue of this case. The dis-
trict court determined that the state is the primary enforcer and
that the EPA is merely a supplemental enforcer. (R.10). The dis-
trict court stated, just as the cases point out, that all of § 309(g)
should be interpreted with this scheme of keeping the primary en-
forcer free of unnecessary interference. (R.10). The enforcement
action by New Union is working. (R.11). The action has been af-
fective in controlling Goldthumb's actions to assure that the con-
taminated material does not overflow into the Arroyo d'Oro and
that Goldthumb does not release even small amounts of lightly
contaminated materials when the Arroyo d'Oro is flowing. (R.11).
The district court, the First Circuit, and the Eight Circuit are
correct in determining that both civil penalties as well as injunc-
tive relief are barred when a primary enforcer is acting to curtail
pollution. To read the statute another way would lead to the ab-
surd or unreasonable result of allowing the state to be forced out
of its primary enforcer status. Further support for this contention
is found when §1319(g) is read in conjunction with § 1215. Section
1215 recognizes that states are the primary enforcer of pollution
regulations. 33 U.S.C. § 1251. The resulting conclusion to read
the state as the primary enforcer and then severe the status would
indeed be the unreasonable or absurd result that the courts
sought to avoid.
[Vol. 20
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss2/11
WILLAMETTE UNIVERSITY BRIEF
2. The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue directly;
therefore, the interpretation remains unsettled
The Supreme Court has not made a definitive interpretation
on the issue whether the bar on civil penalties also bars injunctive
relief when the EPA wants to enforce in conjunction with state
enforcement action. The Court has, however, recognized the sepa-
rate nature of injunctive relief and civil penalties.
In Gwaltney, the Supreme Court recognizes that civil penal-
ties and injunctive relief stem from two different sections of the
CWA. 484 U.S. 49. The Court noted that:
Section 1319 § 309 does not intertwine equitable relief with the
imposition of civil penalties. Instead each kind of relief is sepa-
rately authorized in a separate and distinct statutory provision.
Subsection (b), providing injunctive relief, is independent of sub-
section (d), which provides only for civil penalties.
Gwaltney at 58,quoting Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412, 425 (1987). The
distinction pointed out in Gwaltney has no bearing on the issue in
this case for two reasons.
First, the distinction as pointed out is only dicta of the court
and does not address the exact holding of the Gwaltney decision.
The Supreme Court states that dictum bears no authority in
terms of its precedential value. City of Elkhart v. Brooks, 532 U.S.
1058, 1059 (2001); Aron v. U.S., 291 F.3d 708, 717 (11th Cir.
2002). This statement cannot bear the burden to determine the
outcome in the present case. The distinction is apparent in the
statute between civil penalties and injunctive relief; however, in
the context of this case, the interpretation remains unsettled, as
Gwaltney was not addressing the bar of EPA actions when a state
is enforcing.
The distinction in the Gwaltney case fails to provide guidance
in this case for a second reason. 484 U.S. 49. The Gwaltney Court
relied on a statement made in Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412, to show
the distinct character of the sections containing injunctive relief
and civil penalties. For the purposes of Tull, the distinction is
very important because the issue before the court is whether the
causes of action needed separation to determine the need for a
jury trial for imposition of civil penalties and injunctive relief.
The Court is entirely unconcerned with whether or not §1319(g)
bars civil penalties and injunctive relief. The Court was only try-
ing to distinguish between equitable relief and legal remedies.
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In summary, the Court has distinguished between civil penal-
ties and injunctive relief. The distinction, however, has not been
used to address specifically whether injunctive relief remains in
the EPA's power to use if a state is commencing an action as found
in § 1319(g)(6). The issue remains unsettled; therefore, this court
should follow the holding of the district court's determination that
both civil penalties and injunctive relief are barred.
B. The use of injunctive relief is subject to additional criteria
of which bars the EPA from seeking injunctive relief
The text of the CWA places restrictions on the use of injunc-
tions that bars their use in this case. The directive for use of in-
junctions is found in § 1319(a). This section of the act allows the
EPA toissue compliance orders to violators of the CWA. However,
the administrator may only resort to civil actions, including in-
junctive relief, when the administrator has notified "the person in
alleged violation and such State of such finding." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(a). This section of the CWA seems to give the EPA the abil-
ity to apply injunctive relief to violators of the CWA, but this abil-
ity is further limited in the very same portion of the statute.
Section 1319(a) places a restriction on injunctive relief in that
the EPA must wait thirty days after they have sent notification to
the violator, and then can only request injunctive relief when "the
State has not commenced appropriate enforcement action." 33
U.S.C. § 1319(a). Thus, the reading of § 1319(a) places another
restriction on when the EPA can act after New Union has com-
menced appropriate enforcement action.
The district court determined that the NUDEP "enforcement
has been effective in controlling Goldthumb's actions." (R. 11). The
actions have been controlled and Goldthumb is not releasing
highly or even lightly contaminated materials into the Arroyo.
(R.11). Without a doubt, the appropriateness of New Union's ac-
tion is apparent just from the fact that the solution is working to
curtail the pollution problem. New Union took the appropriate
enforcement action, and therefore, the EPA is barred from seeking
injunctive relief.
To conclude, injunctive relief may be granted when the state
has not commenced an appropriate enforcement action. The ac-
tion by NUDEP has been successful in curtailing the pollution and
is indeed an appropriate and comparable enforcement action.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons state in this brief, Goldthumb Mining Co.,
Inc., respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of
the district court in all respects.
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